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Nestlé Coping with Japanese Nationalism: The establishment and 






This paper focuses on the strategy adopted by the MNE Nestlé in Japan between the 
establishment of a branch at Yokohama in 1913 and the end of World War II. It 
highlights the difficulties encountered by the firm in its attempts to open up and operate 
production facilities due to strong opposition from local condensed milk makers, 
supported by the State. Eventually, in 1934, Nestlé opened a factory by founding an 
incorporated company, ARKK, all of whose shareholders were Japanese working for 
Nestlé. Although the war drastically curtailed the activities of both Nestlé Japan and 
ARKK, the organizational facilities set up during the interwar period provided a 
springboard for Nestlé’s post-war success in Japan. 
 
Keywords: Japan; Switzerland; nationalism; neutrality, MNE; FDI, food industry; 
Nestlé; brand strategy, World War, interwar period,  
Introduction 
During the first third of the 20th century, direct investments by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), mainly American, German and British, played a key role in the industrial 
growth of Japan (Nihon ni okeru gaikoku shihon, 1948; Uchida, 1980; Yamamura, 
                                                 
1
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1986; Udagawa, 1987; Yuzawa and Udagawa, 1990; Mason, 1992). Even though the 
total amount of these investments, estimated by the Japanese Ministry of Finance at 
122.5 million dollars in 1929 (Mason, 1992, p. 46), was extremely small in an 
international comparison (Jones, 2005, p. 156), they were decisive as they enabled 
Japan to acquire technologies in the sectors of the so-called second industrial revolution 
(electricity, chemical, automobile, etc.). The liberal policy towards foreign MNEs that 
the Japanese authorities adopted during the 1890s, such as joining the gold standard 
(1897), acceding to the Paris Convention on Intellectual Property (1899) and adopting a 
new commercial code liberalizing business activities of foreigners (1899), was aimed 
precisely at obtaining new technologies controlled by MNEs or international cartels. 
The first MNE set up in Japan was an American firm, Western Electric Company, 
which invested in Nippon Electric Co. (NEC) in 1899 for producing telephones (Mason, 
1992, pp. 27-35). It was soon followed by many other companies in the following three 
decades. Thus, in 1931, an official survey counted 88 enterprises funded at least 50% by 
foreign capital (Udagawa, 1987, p. 17).  
During the 1930s, however, these MNEs faced a dramatic change in Japanese policy, 
characterized by a stepwise closing of the country and the adoption of measures 
unfavourable to foreign firms. A tendency toward the Japanization of joint ventures was 
evident. Foreign investors were subject to various pressures and saw the proportion of 
their capital drastically diminish (Udagawa, 1987, pp. 18-20). Among the 27 main 
foreign MNEs established in Japan in 1930, 19 had 50% or more of their capital held by 
foreign shareholders (70.4%). In 1941, among 35 companies, only 15 were in such a 
situation (45.9%). Moreover, during the 1930s, the State adopted a set of laws 
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introducing a system of production licenses in order to control such strategic sectors as 
oil (1934), automobile (1936), steel (1937), machine tools (1938), aeronautics (1938), 
shipbuilding (1939) and machines (1941) (Johnson, 1982, pp. 132-133). Usually, 
licenses were only granted to Japanese firms, which greatly limited the activities of 
foreign companies (Udagawa, 1987, pp. 32-37). Finally, after the Pacific War broke out 
in 1941, the assets of MNEs from hostile countries were seized by the Japanese 
authorities. In such a context, MNEs gradually ceased their activities and left Japan. 
One of the rare MNEs that did remain in Japan and even consolidated its 
presence during the 1930s and World War II was the Swiss company Nestlé ( Nestlé & 
Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co., hereafter Nestlé)  (Heer, 1991; Lüpold, 2003; Fenner, 
2008). The neutrality of the firm’s home country certainly played a key role in 
maintaining its strong position, but it does not explain everything. The persistence of 
Nestlé in Japan resulted from a particular strategy of an MNE for penetrating and 
maintaining its presence in the country, and that is the focus of this paper. 
Nestlé and the milk industry in Japan 
Dairy products belong to the new consumer goods with which Japan came into contact 
after it opened up to trade with the West (Nihon nyugyoshi, 1960, pp. 1-13; Hayashi, 
2001, pp. 1-13). During the second half of the 19th century, Japanese society was 
subjected to an acculturation process whereby it gradually adopted various goods and 
lifestyles from Europe and the United States. Whereas there was a quick and massive 
transfer of technology and know-how for infrastructure and industry, Western consumer 
goods were slowly diffused and integrated into the domestic culture, in a process which 
Uchida calls “selective Westernization” (Uchida, 2002, p. 174). Dairy products such as 
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butter, cheese and yoghurt were only gradually assimilated into Japanese eating habits. 
In the West, condensed milk was a new industrial product juxtaposed with traditional 
goods whose use was already widespread, like cheese and butter. In Japan, however, all 
these products were new and their market development sequence took a completely 
opposite path from Europe, starting with fresh milk and condensed milk, followed by 
powdered milk, ice cream and butter, and finally cheese (Hayashi, 2001, p. i). 
Accordingly, in 1913, Japanese production of dairy products was estimated at 565,000 
yen for condensed milk, 242,000 yen for butter, 60,000 yen for margarine, 14,000 yen 
for ice cream, 6,200 yen for cheese and 5,400 yen for yoghurt (Nihon nyugyoshi, 1960, 
p. 47). In Japan, condensed and powdered milk was initially regarded as special 
foodstuff for children, sick persons and the army (Nihon nyugyoshi, 1960, pp. 12-13). 









1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945
 
Source: Zaimusho, 1882-1945 
Note: Powdered milk and condensed milk are not separated in this source between 1882 
and 1927. 
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Trends for imports of condensed and powdered milk highlight the slow 
emergence and structuring of this market. Imports and consumption were almost 
negligible before the second half of the 1890s. The value of imports amounted to less 
than 100,000 yen a year until 1887 then rose to 139,000 yen in 1895, representing a 
scant 410 kg for the entire nation. It was a very limited market, probably mainly geared 
to the foreign community established in the country. Imports subsequently entered a 
period of high growth, reaching an average value of 2.2 million yen between the years 
1907-1912 with an average of 6.1 tons in volume.  
As the dairy products market in Japan became more structured during this period, 
it saw tough competition between two major actors: a few foreign multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) vying against numerous smaller domestic producers. Indeed, the 
growth of the market led the Japanese to go into the new industry, taking advantage of 
successive increases in import duties on condensed milk (in 1904, 1905, 1907 and 1911) 
(Zaimusho, 1960, vol. 2). Yet Japan’s protectionist policy adopted after 1895 did not 
always help the development of the local condensed milk industry. In fact, the raising of 
the import tax on sugar, an essential raw material for this industry in 1901, posed an 
obstacle to its growth and led to a political movement, which resulted in the refund of 
this tax (modoshizei) in 1908 (Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, p. 29). Together with the tax 
hike on imported condensed milk, this paved the way for the development of the 
domestic condensed milk industry. 
Industry growth was also boosted by changing material and technical conditions, 
which became favourable in the 1890s. First, one should mention the basic fact that cow 
breeding and dairy production were new to Japan. Unlike the West, Japan had to 
introduce cows and stock farming in order to be able to produce condensed milk (Nihon 
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nyugyo shi, 1960, pp. 5-23). Second, the technologies and skills necessary for making 
condensed milk were mastered through the process of technology transfer and local 
adaptation, namely the local emulation of the double-lined Inoue evaporation basin 
(1882) and the gradual introduction (1891) and local production of vacuum pans (1910) 
(Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, pp. 13-14, Hayashi, 2001, pp.181, Nakajima, 1967, p.267). 
Third, the improvements made in the food canning technology since the 1900s 
supported the domestic condensed milk industry. Canned food was imported by the 
army during the war against China (1895), and its domestic development was then 
encouraged by the army during the war against Russia (1904-1905). This gave birth to 
Toyo Seikan, a can-producing company founded in 1917 (Toyo Seikan, 1967; 
Yamanaka, 1962, pp. 519-529). It was the first can maker in Japan to produce high-
quality double-sheet cans by introducing an automatic canning line from ACC 
(American Can Company). It also assisted the American condensed milk giant 
Carnation in establishing production facilities in Japan from 1935-1936 (Morinaga, 
1967, pp. 69-70 and 616).
2
 
This political and material backdrop boosted the growth of the industry after 
1900. At first, domestic production was limited, amounting to a meagre average volume 
of 483 kg for the years 1903-1908, which was less than four per cent of domestic 
consumption (see Table 1). On the other hand, the first phase of growth can be observed 
since 1910. Not only did production grow quickly, reaching 500 kg in 1910 and 790 kg 
in 1916, but market share also increased considerably. 
 
                                                 
2
 Carnation adopted a similar camouflage strategy to Nestlé, founding its production subsidiary (Toyo 
Seinyu) with only Japanese board members. It was eventually bought up by Morinaga in 1940. 
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Table 1. Domestic production of condensed milk in Japan, in kg, 1903-1916  
 
 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 
Production, kg 462  480  453  488  480  533  ? 
Self-sufficiency, % 4.8  4.5  3.2  3.8  2.8  2.8  ? 
 
 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 
Production, kg 500  720  1298  1752  ? 518  790  
Self-sufficiency, % 7.2  11.6  18.9  77.9  ? 17.2  25.8  
Source: Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, pp. 33 and 39-40.  
Note: Data for 1909 and 1914 are not known. 
 
The import slump observed during World War I, which can be explained by the 
very high demand for condensed milk in the Western markets, was only short-lived, and 
growth continued during the 1920s. However, the peak of the years 1923-1924, with an 
average of 5.9 million yen and 5.7 tons, was exceptional. It was a result of the 
temporary easing of custom duties as a consequence of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 
1923. For about four months between September 1923 and January 1924, it was 
possible to import condensed and powdered milk tax-free (Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, pp. 
119-121). Protective customs duties were reintroduced at the end of January 1924 and 
raised again twice (1926 and 1932) (Zaimusho, 1960, vol. 2), which explains the sharp 
drop in imports during the 1930s. In 1933, imports fell below the 1 million yen mark, 
which was the level of 1902, and were nil since 1941. It was precisely during the 
interwar period that the big Japanese dairy product companies came on the scene and 
Nestlé tried to set up production in Japan. 
 
The arrival of Nestlé on the Japanese market  
Nestlé & Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co. was an enterprise which established itself 
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as the dominant player in the dairy industry in Japan at the beginning of the 20th 
century. The company was formed in 1905 by a large-scale merger of two Swiss 
enterprises. The first one was the Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co., an Americano-
Swiss company specialized in the production of condensed milk and headquartered in 
Cham, in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, while the second one was the 
company Farine lactée Henri Nestlé in Vevey, in the French-speaking part of the 
country. Both businesses were founded in 1866, and they were already major MNEs 
when they merged in 1905. Together, they possessed a total of 18 production centres, 
among which only 7 were in Switzerland (Heer, 1991, p. 80). 
Nestlé pursued its policy of expansion by establishing and acquiring enterprises 
throughout the world. It experienced especially high growth during World War I, 
buying up many small companies in the United States and in Australia to supply 
condensed milk to the European markets. Nestlé doubled its worldwide production 
capacity between 1914 and 1918 (Heer, 1991, p. 114). After the war, the company faced 
severe financial difficulties and restructured in the 1920s before expanding again in the 
decade that followed so that in 1938 it possessed more than one hundred production 
centres (Heer, 1991, p. 175). This spread was accompanied by a strategy of 
diversification into new fields of food industry, with especially the start of chocolate 
production in 1905 that led to the merger of Peter, Cailler, Kohler Chocolats Suisses SA 
(1929) (Pfiffner, 2010). Finally, in 1938, Nestlé launched the instant coffee Nescafe, 
which went on to become be a major component of the company’s success on the world 
market after World War II. 
Nestlé’s growth entailed several corporate restructurings. Even after the merger 
in 1905, the new group maintained its two former headquarters, one in Cham and one in 
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Vevey, to which were soon added one in London and another in Paris. However, the 
above-mentioned financial crisis after WWI made a fundamental reorganization of the 
company unavoidable, and the management was finally centralized with the 
establishment of a single headquarters in London (1922), which was transferred to 
Vevey shortly thereafter (1924).  
Further expansion of production and sales on a global scale during the 1930s, 
combined with political instability on the European continent, led to a fresh 
reorganization of Nestlé Group in 1936, resulting in a twin-type holding structure 
(Kurosawa, 2010). On the one hand, Nestlé & Anglo-Swiss Co. Ltd. was turned into a 
holding company (Nestlé & Anglo-Swiss Holding Co. Ltd) with its headquarters in 
Switzerland. It controlled various subsidiaries mostly active on the European market, to 
which belonged the former main office in Vevey, now renamed Société des Produits 
Nestlé SA (SPN). On the other hand, the second holding company, named Unilac Inc., 
was created. It was officially based in Panama but had its de facto main headquarters 
(hereafter Nestlé US headquarters) in its American subsidiary based in Stamford 
(Connecticut). It owned subsidiaries in the Western hemisphere (Canada, United States 
and Latin America), which it controlled during WWII. This particular double holding 
and management structure made it possible for Nestlé to continue its business in both 
warring camps during World War II (Kurosawa, 2010; Ruch, Rais-Liechti and Peter, 
2001). Thus, the activities of Nestlé in Japan were successively under the control of the 
London headquarters, which initially supervised the export business to Asia (until 1924), 
then Vevey (1924-1936), Stamford (1936-1941), and then again Vevey after the 
outbreak of the Pacific War between the United States and Japan, which lasted from 
1941 to 1945. 
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Nestlé was therefore an expanding MNE when it arrived in Japan at the 
beginning of the 20th century. The first imports of Nestlé goods were attested at the end 
of the 1890s.
3
 In 1911, the Milkmaid (Nestlé’s brand for unsweetened condensed milk) 
importer in Japan, the American Trading Co., became Nestlé’s official agent for the 
Japanese market. Two years later, in April 1913, a branch office (hereafter Nestlé 
Japan) reporting to the London headquarters was opened at Yokohama, and 
successively moved to Tokyo (1915), Yokohama (1920) then Kobe (1922). It was 
obviously an internalization of the activities of its sales agent, because Nestlé Japan 
indeed hired core employees of American Trading Co. 
4
 This vertical integration 
downstream was consistent with Nestlé’s global strategy, which aimed at controlling the 
distribution of its products more intensely (Heer, 1991, pp. 111-112). Unfortunately, 
there are no documents in the Nestlé archives that provide any statistical information on 
the company’s early activities in Japan, but its main business at the time was the import 
of dairy products into Japan, and distribution was through the powerful Mitsui Trading, 
the trade company of the homonymous zaibatsu.
5
 The only production organized in 
Japan by Nestlé before the 1930s was the manufacture of milk caramels from 1917 or 
1920.
6
 Although some of its Japanese rivals – notably Morinaga Seika from 1914 
onwards (Morinaga, 1967, p. 21) – produced it as their mainstay product, the 
manufacturing of milk caramel by Nestlé was not a result of a systematic strategy for 
the localization of company production but rather an attempt to squeeze additional 
                                                 
3
 Exports of condensed milk amounted to 51,000 francs that year (Deslarzes, 1957, p. 37). 
4
 Archives historiques de Nestlé (AHN), Vevey (Switzerland), 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, 
p. 1. 
5 AHN, 1520 Japan, Production and sale of Eledon and Lactogen in Japan, 29 June 1942 
6
 The year is different according to the sources. AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 2 
quotes 1920 while Fujimoto, N. The Course of Nestlé k.k. in Japan. Spanning the Meiji, Taisho and 
Showa eras, undated (around 1983), p.5 mentions 1917-1918. 
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profits out of the condensed milk business, because its caramels were made from 
defective condensed milk returned by the company’s sales agent to Nestlé.7 
The main MNEs active in importing dairy products into Japan were the 
American companies Borden Co. (condensed milk Eagle)
8
 and Carnation Milk Products 
Co., as well as the Australian Bacchus Marsh Co. (powdered milk Lactogen). 
Furthermore, Borden and Carnation were the main rivals of Nestlé in the world market 
and Bacchus Marsh in the Australian one (Chandler, 1990, pp. 156-157). This 
competition was notably reduced during the 1920s. First, Nestlé took over Bacchus 
Marsh in 1921 as part of its Australian market reorganization strategy,
9
 subsequently 
distributing the Lactogen brand on the Japanese market. Second, in 1926 Nestlé signed 
an agreement with Borden Co. giving it exclusive sales rights to Eagle condensed milk 
in Japan.
10
 Thus, since the mid-1920s, Carnation was Nestlé’s only foreign competitor 
in Japan, but the Swiss firm faced fierce competition from local producers. 
From consumption to production: the birth of an industry 
Nestlé’s main rivals in Japan were the domestic firms that launched the production of 
dairy products during the interwar period. At first, many small manufacturers were 
founded (Meiji, 1969, pp. 29-31). In 1924, there were 11 condensed milk producers, 
possessing a total of 22 factories, and one company (Morinaga) that produced powdered 
milk. Afterwards, a large-scale merger movement occurred, giving birth to a few 
leading firms, essentially Morinaga and Meiji.  
                                                 
7
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Entretiens de M. A. Wiederkehr avec M. M. Champoud, 20 December 1944, p. 15. 
8
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 1. 
9
 Guide to Australian Business Records, www.gabr.net.au (site accessed the 11 March 2010). 
10
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 3.  
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Morinaga was an early competitor for Nestlé. This enterprise was originally a 
cookie factory opened in 1899. It became Morinaga Seika Co. (1912) and quickly 
started producing milk caramels (1914) and chocolate (1918), products for which Nestlé 
dominated the markets at the time.
11
 Morinaga began to manufacture condensed milk 
for its caramel production. In 1917, it bought up Aikoku Condensed Milk and marketed 
its own condensed milk (1918). Afterwards, Morinaga merged many small condensed 
milk makers during the interwar period (Morinaga, 1967, p. 21), while simultaneously 
diversifying its production range, with powdered milk (1920), butter (1924) and lactic 
beverages (1927) (Morinaga, 1967, pp. 29-32). Finally in 1927, its condensed milk 




As for Meiji, its roots go back to a sugar refinery founded in 1906 (Meiji Seito). 
Its confectionery division was spun off under the name of Tokyo Seika Co. (1916), then 
Meiji Seika Co. (1924). This firm invested in a Japanese condensed milk company, 
Boso Condensed Milk Co., taking over half of its capital, and merging it in 1920 (Meiji, 
1969, pp. 483-484). It subsequently adopted a strategy of diversification with the launch 
of ice creams, syrups, sodas, etc. Like Morinaga, it based its growth on merging other 
firms, particularly the condensed milk companies Hokkaido (1933), Sanyo (1934) and 
Far Eastern (1940) (Meiji, 1969, p. 34). 
Led by Morinaga and Meiji, the Japanese condensed milk makers banded 
together in 1919 to form the Japanese Condensed Milk Association (Dainippon rennyu 
kyokai), whose main objectives were to encourage consumption of domestic condensed 
                                                 
11
 AHN, 1520 Japan and Fujimoto, N. The Course of Nestlé k.k. in Japan. Spanning the Meiji, Taisho and 
Showa eras, undated (around 1983), p. 6.  
12
 During World War II, it was successively renamed Morinaga Dairy Industry (1941), reincorporated as 
Morinaga Seika (1942), then became Morinaga Food Industry (1943).  
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milk; to support the exports of this sector; and to promote customs protection (Morinaga, 
1967, pp. 22-24; Nihon nyugyoshi, 1960, pp. 111-119).
13
 Exports from Japan grew 
during the 1920s, increasing from 10 tons in 1915 to 365 tons in 1920 and 356 tons in 
1930 (Morinaga, 1967, p. 64). Together with these joint measures, Morinaga and Meiji 
set up new distribution and sales networks at the end of the 1920s.
14
 They not only 
adopted an aggressive sales policy characterized by the imitation of foreign brands’ 
packaging and the choice of prices lower than imported products, but they also 
integrated all their retailers into associations in order to effectively control the market 
(Ishihara and Tahagi, 2004, pp. 20-22). 
To cope with such competition, Nestlé had no choice but to proceed to relocate 
its production to Japan. As the director of Nestlé Japan, Champoud reminded it in July 
1943: “Import duties had gradually been much raised and finally made it practically 
prohibitive to import milk products. This was the main reason why in principle I 
immediately decided that we had to get our own factory in Japan if we wanted to have a 
chance of remaining in the market.”15 Nevertheless, the Swiss MNE faced major 
difficulties in realizing this project. 
The difficulty of opening up production in Japan 
Very soon, Nestlé started thinking of opening a production centre in Japan, a strategy 
which was by the way adopted on a global scale at the beginning of the 20th century 
(Heer, 1991, pp. 108-120). Around 1915, it attempted to begin negotiations with a local 
company Far Eastern Condensed Milk through the powerful Mitsui Trading Co., but to 
                                                 
13
 It was renamed the Japanese Milk Industry Association (Danihon seinyu kyokai) in 1923.  
14
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 5. 
15
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 6. 
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 It took Nestlé another two such attempts (1926-1928 and 1931) before it 
managed to acquire a plant of its own (1934). 
The attempts to invest in Hokkaido (1926-1931) 
Between 1926 and 1931, Nestlé tried twice to open up local production in Japan in the 
form of a joint venture with Japanese condensed milk companies. It failed in both cases, 
due to the fierce opposition generated by its efforts. 
The first attempt was a joint venture proposal Nestlé made to the company 
called Dainippon Nyuseihin (Dairy Products), the biggest condensed milk producer in 
Hokkaido, which was in dire financial straits (Meiji, 1969, p. 107). The first approach 
took place in 1926 and led to long negotiations for which Louis Dapples, general 
director and big boss of Nestlé & Anglo-Swiss Co., visited Japan for this deal. It was 
decided in 1928 to set up a joint venture in which Nestlé would hold half of the 
capital.
17
 However, this project immediately triggered fierce opposition by the Japanese 
Condensed Milk Association and was soon given up (Morinaga, 1967, pp. 53-55; Nihon 
nyugyoshi, 1960, p. 9). Dainippon Nyuseihin was finally taken over by Meiji in 1932 
(Meiji, 1969, pp. 106-113). 
Despite this failure, the restructuring of business in Japan was a key issue and 
Nestlé’s general management in Switzerland sent a new manager to Japan in 1930 for 
this purpose. Called back from Africa, Maurice Champoud was given a twofold 
objective: modernizing the distribution system and setting up production in Japan.
18 
He 
retained influential politician Ariyoshi Chuichi as an ally. Ariyoshi was the former 
                                                 
16
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 3 and Nihon nyugyoshi, 1960, p. 162. 
17
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 4 and Nihon nyugyoshi, 1960, pp. 163-164. 
18
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 5. 
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governor of Hyogo prefecture (Kobe), former mayor of Yokohama and a member of the 
House of Peers.
19
 The reorganization of distribution, a strategy adopted then by Nestlé 
in all of its markets, aimed at doing away with wholesalers and selling directly to 
retailers.
20
 However, this strategy was not possible in Japan, because it would have been 
vetoed by Nestlé’s wholesaler at the time, Mitsui Trading Company. 
In 1931, a second joint venture project was adopted by Nestlé and the Hokkaido 
League of Cooperatives for Dairy Production and Sales (Hokkaido Seiraku Hambai 
Kumiai Rengokai) (Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, pp. 171-174).
21
 At the time, dairy farmers 
in Hokkaido were in a critical situation and were fighting with Japanese condensed milk 
producers over prices and supply conditions. Seizing this opportunity, the Swiss MNE 
offered the League to leave half of the capital and the head office to Japanese citizens in 
the joint venture, in return for a fresh milk supply from member farmers of the League. 
Nestlé further promised not to enter butter production so as to avoid competition with 
these same farmers.
22
 However, this attempt led once again to fierce protests by the 
Japanese Milk Industry Association, which successfully lobbied the highest authorities 
in Tokyo (Prime Minister, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forest, House of Peers) and the country as a whole (Morinaga, 1967, p. 55). The 
project was soon dropped. 
                                                 
19
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Entretiens de M. A. Wiederkehr avec M. M. Champoud, 20 December 1944, p. 4 and 
Nichigai, 2004, vol. 2, p. 120. 
20
 AHN, 1520 Japan, Notes on Japan, 15 July 1943, p. 7. 
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The creation of Awaji Rennyu K.K. (1934) 
Nestlé finally succeeded in setting up a production center in Japan in 1934, with the 
foundation of Awaji Condensed Milk (abbreviated as ARKK following the Japanese 
name).
23
 It originated as a condensed milk factory, Fuji Condensed Milk, founded by 
Fujii Chojiro in Hirota, Hyogo Prefecture in 1919 (Morinaga, 1967, p. 55). Faced with 
financial difficulties, its owner was looking for someone to take over the firm and was 
engaged in negotiations with Meiji Seika and the American MNE Carnation Co. and 
General Milk Co., without reaching an agreement. Then, Fujii approached Nestlé in 
January 1933.
24
 Considering that “it was about the last chance for a foreign concern to 
establish itself”,25 Champoud paid 40,000 yen in advance and began negotiations that 
lasted through July. The acquisition was finally agreed at 430,000 yen. According to 
Champoud, “the price paid by us was of course out of proportion with the value of 
factory and a substantial proportion of the total amount had been entered in the new 
company’s books as goodwill. This item as a matter of fact represented the price we had 
to pay to establish a factory in Japan and at the time to shut out Carnation and prevent 
Meiji from getting hold of this last opportunity.”26 
In order to buy up this company, Nestlé created a new company in October 1933, 
Fuji Milk Products Co. with a capital of 250,000 yen.
27
 The balance of capital necessary 
to take over Fuji Condensed Milk and to modernize its equipment was obtained as a 
loan from a financial company established in Lichtenstein, obviously by Nestlé, the 
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 In 1934, Fuji Milk Products raised its capital to 
300,000 yen and adopted a new name: Awaji Rennyu Co. (ARKK). Although Nestlé 
Japan had already engaged in marketing in the country, production on Japanese soil was 
envisaged through a separate company. The ownership structure and management of 
this new company evince some particularities that can be explained by the difficulties 
that foreign MNEs in Japan faced during the interwar years (see figure 2). For Nestlé, 
the objective was to disguise its stake in the plant. 
Figure 2. Ownership and control structure of the Nestlé group and ARKK (1934-1940s) 
Nestlé & Anglo-Swiss Co. Ltd. (-1936)
Nestlé and Anglo-Swiss Holding Co. Ltd. (1936-)
Cham and Vevey, Switzerland (HQs in Vevey)
Nestlé’s  UK 
Subsidiary 
(London)
A. P. I.  (Glarus, 
Switzerland) 
via Unilac Inc.(Panama) since 1936
Control (1913-1939) (1939-41)
Awaji Rennyu KK (ARKK)
(Awaji, Japan)
Locally incorporated production 
company
Officially only with Japanese board members, but 













locally provided technical 
assistance








Société des Produits 
Nestlé S.A. (1936-) 
（Vevey, Switzerland）
Nestlé Japan (Kobe)







Source: Designed by the authors, based on the sources referred to in the main text and 
footnotes 
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As far as Champoud was concerned, the capital was “controlled by our group.”29 
The necessary capital of 300,000 yen was made available by three companies which 
belonged to Nestlé & Anglo-Swiss Holding Co. The money was given to the seven 
shareholders of ARKK, all of whom were Japanese nationals and all of whom had 
strong connections with Nestlé Japan (employees and advisors). They received these 
loans against “some securities”,30 probably as bank loans by share collateral as was 
often seen in Japan (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 41). For Nestlé, “economically 
speaking, ARKK was therefore a Swiss company.”31 The financial dependency of 
ARKK on the Swiss holding was also strengthened by a mortgage loan of about 1.5 
million yen. Moreover, ARKK relied on Nestlé’s technology and know-how. In 1934, 
an agreement was signed with the company A.P.I., a firm within the Nestlé group, 
whose main tasks were technical assistance and patent management for the entire 
group.
32
 The production of dairy goods was then supervised by an engineer of this 
company, Ruch, who stayed in Japan until 1945. From 1934 onwards, Nestlé Japan was 
thinking of expanding its production capacity. In 1936, it acquired a plant under 
Morinaga based in Saidaiji in the neighboring prefecture of Okayama, and turned it into 
a dairy goods plant that was “the most modern in Japan.”33 Some powdered milk was 
notably produced there from 1938 (Nihon nyugyoshi, 1960, p. 217). Moreover, tight 
links existed between ARKK and Nestlé Japan. First, the administration of both 
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companies was centralized. They shared the same office in Kobe, and Champoud, the 
director of Nestlé Japan, was the de facto director of ARKK, though the fact was 
officially disclaimed. Second, both enterprises signed a production agreement in 1934 
whereby ARKK was to work exclusively for Nestlé, producing condensed milk under a 
licensing agreement. In 1939, a second production agreement was drawn up allowing 
ARKK to produce and sell goods other than Nestlé’s original brand. ARKK paid 
royalties to Nestlé for this kind of production as well.
34
 
The establishment of ARKK appears to reflect a clear desire to hide Nestlé’s 
involvement in local production in Japan by disguising it as the actions of a Japanese 
firm. For example, in July 1943, Champoud recalled that “when speaking of Hirota and 
Saidaiji factories, we should never mention “our factories” but “the factories of our 
friends, etc.” except of course in correspondence with the management.”35 Nevertheless, 
the meaning and the scope of this tactics are obscure. Indeed, even if the desire for 
camouflage is real, Japanese competitors were definitively not fools. As early as 1930, 
when Nestlé was trying to establish itself in Hokkaido, its Japanese rivals were well-
informed about the negotiations at an early stage. Again in 1933, when Nestlé initiated 
negotiations with Fuji Condensed Milk, it was exposed immediately by Japanese 
competitors. Fuji was immediately expelled from the Japanese Milk Industry 
Association. The association further condemned Nestlé’s desire to market its upcoming 
product produced on Japanese soil under its global brand, thus making it look like 
imported goods, instead of enhancing its value as compared with the product of local 
rivals (Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, p. 175). Actually, Nestlé Japan explained in 1941 in a 
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retrospective summary that “under the constraint of legal prescriptions, the shareholders 
had to announce [the loans they benefited from Nestlé Holding] for buying ARKK 
shares.”36 From that time onwards, “ARKK was thus officially known as a foreign 
firm.”37  
More than a will to hide its investment in a plant, Nestlé’s strategy appears to be 
a desire to distinguish between production and marketing in the context of a very 
unstable environment. As ARKK did not possess any brand, its expropriation or 
requisition for any reason would not jeopardize the comparative advantage acquired by 
Nestlé’s brands on the Japanese market from the early 20th century onwards. 
 
The “milk war”38 
Japanese condensed milk producers reacted vehemently to the presence of Nestlé on 
Awaji Island. With Morinaga in the lead, four enterprises founded an association called 
the Joint Association for National Condensed Milk (Kokusan rennyu kyodo kumiai) in 
August 1933, with the aim of setting up a rival business in Awaji and thus taking over 
control of the supply of local fresh milk from ARKK, which came with the opening of a 
butter factory at Hirota, adjacent to ARKK, in September 1933. This strategy was 
reinforced with the foundation of the Joint Association for the Sale of Condensed Milk 
(Kyodo rennyu hanbai kumiai), which Meiji now joined. In December 1933, it set up 
the firm Kyodo Kokusan Condensed Milk (Meiji, 1969, p. 94; Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, 
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 and started producing dairy goods in Awaji as of May 1935 (Nihon 
nyugyo shi, 1960, p. 187). 
Nestlé reacted first by ordering fresh milk from Tokushima on the neighbouring 
island of Shikoku. It even planned to relocate its plant there but could not obtain the 
necessary authorization (Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, p. 188). The difficulties encountered 
in sourcing fresh milk explain why Nestlé did not develop its Hirota plant within its 
expansion strategy but was rather looking for another site. After two years of research 
all over the country, in 1936 it initiated negotiations with its rival, Morinaga, which was 
then thinking of getting rid of a small plant at Saidaiji in Okayama prefecture, due to the 
limited size of the milk district. This plant was bought up by Nestlé in 1936 for 50,000 
yen.
40
 The objective of this acquisition was to buy “Morinaga’s skeleton factory in order 
to acquire the milk district and to obtain the right to manufacture, whilst a bigger site 
was purchased to erect an entirely new factory after Morinaga’s plant would have been 
torn down.”41  
After Nestlé arrival in Saidaiji, the company Kyodo Kokusan Condensed Milk 
no longer had any reason for being. It was dissolved and the plant was bought up by 
Meiji in July 1937 (Meiji, 1969, p. 96). However, the supply of milk on Awaji Island 
continued to be the subject of conflict between Nestlé and Meiji for several years. Both 
wanted to dominate this market, and dairy farmers could easily raise their prices due to 
this rivalry. Moreover, the price increase was strengthened by the waging of the war 
against China in 1937, as the dairy farmers who had previously imported forage mainly 
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from Manchuria ran into sourcing problems.
42
 Milk prices continued to increase and 
both Nestlé and Meiji were losing money. An agreement on sharing fresh milk on Awaji 
Island was finally signed in 1940 by both parties, allocating 64 per cent of production to 




Staying in Japan despite the war 
The war not only put an end to the trade relationship between Japan and the West, but it 
also led to the adoption of specific measures unfavorable for MNEs from enemy nations 
(transfer of assets to Japanese companies, expropriation of patents, etc.) (Mason, 1992, 
pp. 103-104). Under these circumstances, most of the MNEs gave up their business and 
left Japan. The rare exceptions like Nestlé which decided to stay on had to face a new 
interventionist economic policy (tosei keizai) based on the Law on the General 
Mobilization of the State (kokka sodoin) adopted in March 1938 (Hara, 2003). 
In the case of the dairy industry, the main characteristic of this policy was the 
control of distribution by the State. In October 1940, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forests adopted a decree on the control of milk and dairy products’ distribution (gyunyu 
oyobi nyuseihin haikyu dosei kisoku), which remained in force until March 1950. 
Concerning condensed and powdered milk in particular, it defined the packaging of 
goods (weight and label), the list of authorized suppliers, among which was Nestlé, as 
well as the mode of distribution (Meiji, 1969, pp. 158-159). Distribution was centralized 
with the creation of the Japan Milk Association (Dainippon seirakugyo kumiai), which 
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became a unique wholesaler to which makers could sell their products at fixed prices 
(Suwa, 1975, pp. 51-52). As for the sale of milk caramels, it was also subjected to 
similar control with the establishment of a Confectioners Association.
44
 In 1941, the 
Japan Milk Association decided that condensed milk could be only marketed under 
anonymous brands.
45
 Nestlé Japan, which moreover experienced some difficulties in 
accessing raw material supply,
46
 wondered at that point whether or not it was worth 
staying on in Japan under such severe conditions.  
On 1 November 1940, Nestlé’s US headquarters, to which Nestlé Japan reported 
at the time, wrote to the Swiss holding to let it know about its decision to close the 
Japanese subsidiary at the end of the year, “for, since a while already, the position was 
becoming more and more difficult.”47 The new distribution policy led indeed to very 
severe financial difficulties: on the one hand, the maximum prices fixed by the Japan 
Milk Association were lower than production costs for some articles (Lactogen, Eledon), 
while on the other hand, retailers refused to sell Nestlé products due to expected low 
profit margins. 
The strategy of Nestlé’s US headquarters was not to end its activities on the 
Japanese market completely but rather to reorganize the presence of the firm to avoid 
further financial losses. As Nestlé Japan was in fact merely an intermediary between 
ARKK and the Japan Milk Association, it “has thus no more any raison d’être in 
Japan.”48 ARKK was to deliver its products directly to the Japan Milk Association, but 
with new brands: Milkyway for milks, Arkogen instead of Lactogen and Arkedon for 
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 The ultimate purpose was to protect Nestlé’s traditional brands. That was the 
reason why Nestlé US headquarters envisaged maintaining Nestlé Japan just to keep its 
brands registered in Japan. It concluded its report with the following words: “The best 
we could is to sweat it out; hoping one day things will come back into a more normal 
order, for Japan will not vanish out of the map and as long as we have our factories 
there and they are our property, we can keep a glimmer of hope.”50 The management of 
Nestlé was then swaying between a short-term strategy of striking a financial balance 
between subsidiaries and a long-term vision of maintaining acquired positions. In the 
final analysis, the Swiss headquarters chose to follow the second path, namely, holding 
on to Nestlé Japan. 
Some hesitations were still perceptible at the beginning of the following year. In 
February 1941, Nestlé Japan wrote to Nestlé US headquarters to report on its 
proposition to procure all its assets in Japan. Even though the decision to stay had been 
made, Nestlé Japan asked for confirmation from headquarters because the acquisition 
required gold currency instead of the yen. “The future is so uncertain today that no 
intelligent forecast can be made of what the fate of foreign investments and even private 
Japanese investments will become in future.”51 Champoud, the director of Nestlé Japan, 
added that it was probably the last opportunity to sell Nestlé for its real value, but he 
also underscored “the chance to remain established in Japan and possibly expand again 
when circumstances will improve.”52 Finally, he finished his letter by writing that “it 
looks even more today than before that Japan will become one center, if not the most 
important one, of the dairy industry and trade in Far East and taking a long view we 
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have therefore hardly any reason to change our policy to retain our place in the sun.”53 
Nestlé US headquarters was against the cessation of activities and answered this letter 
by saying, “having secured the position we have, after great struggle and many 
difficulties, we should remain established but he [Muller, president of Nestlé US 
headquarters] added that he would consider any offer made on the approximate basis of 
US$ 550,000 for all our assets.”54 
Finally, some final plans to abandon the Japanese market were mooted in 1943, 
in the context of negotiations related to a merger with competitors. The first involved 
Meiji, which adopted in the early 1940s a strategy of growth through mergers of rival 
companies and the acquisition of plants (Meiji, 1969, pp. 170-171). In this context, 
Meiji approached Nestlé in January 1943, offering to take over its Saidaiji plant. The 
Swiss MNE refused, arguing “we want to retain the advantage we have gained by being 
established for several years.”55 The second acquisition proposal was made in 1943 by 
Kanematsu & Co., a trading firm specialized in imports of raw wool from Australia. 
Kanematsu’s core business was in difficulty at the time due to the war, and the company 
was seeking new business opportunities. Fearing the arrival of a newcomer on the milk 
market after the war, Nestlé rejected these offers.
56
  
Despite its decision to maintain activities in Japan, Nestlé had to deal with the 
insistent demands of the Japanese authorities, which tried from 1941 onwards to take 
over both ARKK plants, a desire that became more pressing in 1943.
57
 Here, there are 
military reasons why the authorities intervened that had little to do with Nestlé’s foreign 
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nature; the army had been taking over most civilian goods producers due to war 
production. In 1944, under the threat of requisitioning, ARKK had to rent out its 
Saidaiji plant to the company Kokobu Shoten pursuant to an order from the Osaka 
Military Intendance.
58
 In May 1945, the Hirota plant was lent to Kanematsu & Co. 
under pressure from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests.
59
 
The requisitioning of ARKK’s plants put an end to Nestlé’s production in Japan 
in 1944. Although Champoud, director of Nestlé Japan since 1930 and kingpin of the 
relocation of production to Japan, returned to Switzerland in July 1944, the Japanese 
subsidiary was not closed down. Two Swiss citizens stayed on in Japan: Tillmann, an 
executive of Nestlé Japan, took over responsibility for this branch, and Ruch, the 
engineer of SEASI (formerly A.P.I.). With their only presence, they managed to secure 
Nestlé’s presence in Japan with a single idea in mind: the post-war era.  
The revival of production activities after 1945 
Whereas investment by foreign MNEs in Japan was strictly limited and severely 
controlled until the 1960s, Nestlé quickly resumed its activities in the immediate 
aftermath of the war (Mason, 1992, pp. 150-198). A new director was sent to Japan as 
soon as the fighting ended, Edmond Mandelert, a former employee of the Shanghai 
branch. He was one of the first foreign businessmen to arrive in Japan after the end of 
the war and stayed on as director of Nestlé Japan until 1965 (Nestlé Japan Group, 2003, 
pp.14-17). In the dairy industry, the interventionist economic policy (tosei keizai) 
remained in force until 1950. Until the beginning of that decade, Mandelert’s main task 
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consisted of negotiating the revival of activities with the authorities and reorganizing the 
supply of fresh milk (by providing credits to farmers, rebuilding dairies, etc.). 
Nestlé regained control of both its factories on 5 January 1946.
60
 In July-August 1949, it 
officially bought back ARKK from its Japanese shareholders and obtained authorization 
to restart commercial activities (import and distribution).
61
 Both factories had escaped 
destruction by air raids, unlike the Kobe office, making a quick revival possible. The 
production of sweetened (Eagle) and unsweetened (Milkmaid) condensed milk products 
resumed in 1950, followed shortly by other Nestlé goods. However, the market was 
very unstable during the first half of the 1950s, due to weak demand. Nestlé therefore 
restructured its production business in 1954 by closing its Saidaiji factory and by 
consolidating in Hirota (Nestlé Japan Group, 2003, p.14). At the same time, imports 
recovered in 1953. As the authorities strictly controlled the distribution of foreign 
currencies and foreign trade, between 1954 and 1957, Nestlé exported to Brazil tinplate 
sheet and packing materials for coffee beans purchased in Japan, in order to have at 
hand the currencies necessary to import instant coffee (Nescafe) from Brazil.
62
  
Rather than locally produced condensed milk, the import of Nescafe –authorized in 
1953 and liberalized in 1961 – and its production in Japan was the main thrust which 
shored up Nestlé’s position in the post-war food business in Japan.63 However, the 
legacy of the pre-war milk business in Japan,  namely, the company’s established brand 
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and its products, together with the retained organizational and human resources, were 
the most basic condition for Nestlé’s new success in the post-war Japanese market. 
Conclusion 
Nestlé’s implantation on the Japanese market was the result of a slow and difficult 
process that lasted nearly forty years. In the course of the import substitution process in 
Japan, the firm was challenged by local milk producers on the one hand and coped with 
an economic policy that was unfavourable to foreign direct investments on the other 
hand, delaying Nestlé’s local production in Japan. 
Indeed, after having opened a subsidiary in Kobe in 1913, it took Nestlé around 
twenty years of negotiation and confrontation with the local condensed milk producers 
before it finally acquired its own plant through an investment in Awaji Condensed Milk 
(ARKK) in 1934. At the time, Nestlé was the only foreign MNE in the food industry 
producing locally in Japan. Yet the creation of ARKK does not appear as the end but 
rather as the beginning of a new phase of open confrontation with local firms and the 
authorities. Indeed, for more than ten years, the Swiss MNE faced problems with regard 
to fresh milk supplies, control of distribution, relinquishment of its brands and, finally, 
the forced rental of its plants, not to mention declining profits due to the war. Despite 
these difficulties, Nestlé never gave up the position it had acquired. As MNEs were 
leaving Japan in droves during the 1930s, Nestlé hung on and turned down various 
takeover proposals. The Swiss management of the holding consistently kept the post-
war period in mind. The position that Nestlé could reach by the mid-1930s was to 
enable it to dominate the dairy industry after the end of the war. That was also why a 
new director was sent to Japan as soon as the war ended. The tenacity of the Swiss 
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MNE paid off in the end. Nestlé was not only one of the very few foreign MNEs to be 
active in Japan in the second half of the 1950s, but also soon became one of a handful of 
non-Japanese influential food companies on the local market, which is characterized by 
a non-Western food culture. 
Beyond the case study presented here, one should wonder what the example of 
Nestlé in Japan tells us about the nature of Swiss MNEs. Two main features can be 
underscored: the tenacity and long-term strategy of Nestlé, and the “camouflaging” of 
its activities.  
First, a long-term strategic perspective clearly seems to be a characteristic of 
Nestlé’s management throughout the 20th century. More than short-term profit, the 
sometimes slow but constant acquisition of dominant positions in various markets 
appears as a key issue for Swiss managers. Tetsuya Kuwahara has for example showed 
that, unlike General Foods of the United States, Nestlé adopted a policy of maintaining 
its foreign – mainly Swiss – managers in Japan for long periods after World War II, 
enabling them to gain wide knowledge of the local market and its environment 
(Kuwahara, 2009). This long-term strategy was also adopted elsewhere in the world. 
When Saigon fell in April 1975, Nestlé’s representative in Vietnam was one of the last 
Swiss citizens to live in the country, having received the order from the holding “to 
think by no means of an evacuation before the staff of the Swiss embassy”.64 In the 
ensuing weeks, Nestlé founded a new joint venture with the Communist government for 
the production of powdered milk (Gaffino, 2006, p. 205). Moreover, this long-term 
strategy was not unique to Nestlé. Among the foreign MNEs established in Japan during 
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the 20th century, noteworthy continuity can be observed in the case of Swiss MNEs 
(Brown Boveri & Co., Ciba Ltd., Sandoz, Sulzer Brothers Ltd.), whereas MNEs from 
other countries seem to have been more volatile (Kuwahara, 2007). 
Second, the “invisible” nature of Nestlé’s direct investment in ARKK was not 
limited to this case. Other Swiss firms active in Japan during the first half of the 20th 
century also adopted this type of strategy, like the trading company Liebermann 
Waelchi & Co., which was legally considered a Japanese firm at the end of the war.
65
 
This was also the case with the watchmaker Rodolphe Schmid, who invested in 1930 in 
a company in Japan, Citizen Watch Co., through some of his Japanese employees 
(Donze, 2010). Therefore, it could be tempting to see this trait as confirmation of the 
thesis of the Swiss historian Sébastien Guex, who emphasized the “camouflage practice 
cultivated by Swiss ruling elites” (Guex, 1999, p. 11). In the specific case of Japan, 
however, this does not appear to be a feature unique to Switzerland; in the milk industry, 
the American company Carnation adopted a similar strategy at the beginning of the 
1930s (Nihon nyugyo shi, 1960, pp. 185-186). Due to the very discrete nature of such a 
practice, it is difficult to approach it in a systemic way, but it seems to have been used 
by diverse MNEs for various reasons, and can also help explain the so-called low level 
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